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DETERRENCE IN A SEA OF "JUST
DESERTS": ARE UTILITARIAN GOALS
ACHIEVABLE IN A WORLD OF "LIMITING
RETRIBUTIVISM"?
MATTHEW HAIST*
Recent scholarship on theories of criminal punishment has
increasingly focused on retributivist justifications for punishment. While
within this retributivist camp opinions differ as to the particulars of such
policies, there is general agreement that criminals getting what they
deserve, that is, their 'just deserts," should be the underlying goal and
rationale of the criminal justice system. From this point, these scholars
argue that a criminal should receive punishment according to what the
criminal deserves. Some forms of retributivism, however, have attempted to
draw support from other theories of criminal punishment. By borrowing
elements of other theories, specifically utilitarian theories, scholars have
attempted to bolster support for retributivist policies. A particularly well
received form of retributivism and the focus of this Comment, "limiting
retributivism, " argues that a range of punishments will fall within the
criminal's just deserts, and that utilitarian concepts can alter the
punishment within the aforementioned range. This Comment scrutinizes
limiting retributivism 's appeal to utilitarian theories of punishment to
determine if such a system of punishment can achieve many of the outcomes
sought by utilitarian theories, specifically deterrence.
This Comment argues that the answer to this question, while complex,
is ultimately no. I begin my inquiry by expounding on the history of
retributive and utilitarian theories of punishment, and the specific concepts
of limiting retributivism and what 'factors" exist in determining a
criminal's just deserts. Then, I shift focus and analyze the practical effects
of these factors in light of recent behavioral psychology and behavioral law
and economics research on cognitive biases. Subsequently, I describe why
these insights into human psychology and the effects of cognitive biases, as
J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2009; A.B., Davidson College, 2003. I
would like to thank the editorial staff of the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology for
their comments and corrections, and as always, my parents, David and Louise.
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applied to the retributive factors in determining just deserts, will actually
lead to under-deterrence of criminal activity. I develop this point by
acknowledging that while this research also questions utilitarianism's
proposal for deterrence through ex ante incentives, the under-deterrence
effect of limiting retributivism is far higher than that of utilitarianism. I
also highlight why such under-deterrence is fundamentally contrary to
utilitarian goals of punishment. I end by arguing that, given the insights of
behavioral psychology, utilitarian goals of punishment are not sufficiently
accomplished under limiting retributivism. A more pure form of
utilitarianism is required to achieve utilitarian goals with hard and fast
criminal rules with no appeal to or use of other theories of punishment. I
also propose that utilitarians, in collaboration with behavioral law and
economics scholars, can further understanding of how the criminal law may
incorporate behavioral psychology insights to create more effective ex ante
incentives.
I. INTRODUCTION
The question of why we should punish criminals is age-old, and elicits
many more answers than the lay person would imagine. Punishing what
society deems wrong or unwise seems to be an integral part of any
civilization.1 Specific guidelines for punishment date back to Hammurabi's
Code,2 while theoretical and philosophical justifications for punishment can
be seen as early as Aristotle.3 Simply put, criminal justice is, and has
always been, at the center of public concern, so much so that modem
societies often view and compare themselves to one another through the
lens of what we now call criminal justice.4 Given the importance of
criminal justice to obtaining a safe and prosperous society, recent
developments in the field must constantly be monitored to ensure that we
operate under a theory of criminal punishment that either is optimally in
1 I have not found any evidence or instance of a society that does not have a form of
punishment.
2 HAMMURABI'S CODE OF LAWS (c. 1780 B.C.E.) (L.W. King trans.), available at
http://www.fordham.eduihalsall/ancient/hamcode.html (last visited May 1, 2009).
3 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHIcS 200-01 (Roger Crisp trans., Cambridge Univ. Press
2000).
4 One only needs to look toward the Europeans' general view of the death penalty and
their detestation of continued U.S. support for such punishment to see evidence of this
comparison. Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Kansas v. Marsh highlights this point.
126 S. Ct. 2516, 2532 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("There exists in some parts of the
world sanctimonious criticism of America's death penalty.").
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line with our concepts of morality or best serves to provide the needed
5security.
Fortunately, scholars have spent much time and effort-increasingly
so within the past twenty to thirty years-debating this issue. 6  These
debates affect our view of which system of criminal punishment is ideal,
and demonstrate that the discussion is never-ending.7 Criminal justice has
evolved over the millennia and will continue to do so over the next. Under
Hammurabi's Code, the punishment for almost any crime was death. 8
Under the Qur'an, crimes were given specific punishments, yet required a
particular level of proof to be established to find guilt.9 English common
law guaranteed a criminal defendant a right to trial by his or her peers. I°
And our founding fathers added the right against self-incrimination and the
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, while preserving the English
common law right to trial by jury.1
5 If one gives credence to social contract theory, security and safety is the principal
reason individuals enter society in the first place. Therefore, preservation of individuals'
interests, be they bodily integrity, property interests, or general liberties, should be the main
priority and obligation of government. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 121 (Richard Tuck
ed., rev. student ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1651) ("A Common-wealth is said to be
Instituted ... [so] that Man, or Assembly of men.., live peacefully amongst themselves,
and be protected against other men."); JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT 269-
78 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2002) (1698); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE
SOCIAL CONTRACT AND THE FIRST AND SECOND DISCOURSES 163-64 (Susan Dunn trans., Yale
Univ. Press 2002).
6 See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A
Retrospective on the Past Century and Some Thoughts About the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1
(2003); Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of "Just" Punishment,
96 Nw. U. L. REV. 843 (2002); Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67
(2005); Norval Morris, Desert as a Limiting Principle, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING 201
(Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth eds., 1992); Alice Ristroph, Desert, Democracy,
and Sentencing Reform, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1293 (2006); Paul H. Robinson &
John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 453 (1997).
7 See supra note 6.
8 HAMMURABI'S CODE OF LAWS, supra note 2 (stating, for example, in Code number six
that "[i]f any one steal the property of a temple or of the court, he shall be put to death, and
also the one who receives the stolen thing from him shall be put to death," and in Code
number fourteen that "[i]f any one steal the minor son of another, he shall be put to death").
9 AN INTERPRETATION OF THE QUR'AN [THE KORAN], Al-mi'idah 5:38, at 113 (Majid
Fakhry trans., bilingual ed., N.Y. Univ. Press 2002) ("As for the thieves, whether male or
female, cut off their hands in punishment for what they did ... ").
1o See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 349
(Dawsons of Pall Mall 1966) (1768); see also A.E. DICK HOWARD, MAGNA CARTA: TEXT
AND COMMENTARY § 39 (Univ. Press of Virginia 1964) (1215) ("No free man shall be taken,
imprisoned, disseised, oulawed, banished, or in any way destroyed, nor will We proceed
against or prosecute him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers and by the law of the
land.").
I U.S. CONST. amend. V, VII-VIII.
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This evolution of criminal procedures and customs has been
accompanied by rigorous academic debate over the goals and rationales of
criminal punishment. 12 The progression can be seen from its beginning
under Aristotle,' 3 to the nineteenth century works of Immanuel Kant 14 and
Jeremy Bentham, 5 and into the twentieth and now twenty-first centuries.
16
Today, the debate largely involves three theories of criminal punishment:
utilitarianism, retributivism, and denunciation-although denunciation
tends to take a back seat to the first two frameworks.' 7
Some modem scholars have attempted to form theories of punishment
by mixing the three concepts into a single theory of punishment, or have
argued in favor of one theory through appeals to another.1 8 A common
argument is to support a retributivist system of punishment, but with
attempts to appeal to certain utilitarian concerns.' 9 The most widely
accepted form of this theory is Norval Morris's "limiting retributivism.
20
This Comment attempts to further the debate over theories of criminal
punishment by investigating whether such retributivist appeals to
utilitarianism are valid and can achieve utilitarian goals. Specifically, this
Comment seeks to determine whether Morris's limiting retributivism
theory, and its appeal to utilitarian concepts, can achieve utilitarian goals.
I undertake to answer this question in five parts. Part II presents a
brief historical overview of theories of criminal punishment in order to
provide the reader with sufficient background and context to understand the
recent movements in this debate. Part III then describes the current
movement of scholarship towards the retributivist camp, the several factors
that potentially determine the severity of a criminal's punishment under a
retributive theory of punishment, and, finally, this camp's attempted appeal
to utilitarianism. Part IV describes the concept of limiting retributivism in
12 See supra note 6.
13 ARISTOTLE, supra note 3, at 200-01.
14 IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN EXPOSITION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE AS THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT 194-204 (W. Hastie trans.,
Edinburgh, I.&T. Clark 1887) (1796).
15 JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION (1781), reprinted in 1 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 1, 83-96 (John
Bowring ed., Thoemmes Press 1995) [hereinafter MORALS AND LEGISLATION]; JEREMY
BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF PENAL LAW (1843), reprinted in 1 THE WORKS OF JEREMY
BENTHAM, supra, 365, 396-97.
16 See supra note 6.
17 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 14-19 (4th ed. 2006).
1" Id. at 11-24.
19 See Norval Morris, Punishment, Desert and Rehabilitation, in SENTENCING 257
(Hyman Gross & Andrew von Hirsch eds., 1981).
20 See Ristroph, supra note 6, at 1301-02.
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greater detail. Part V describes why limiting retributivism's appeal to
utilitarianism cannot succeed. In doing so, it utilizes recent behavioral
psychology research to demonstrate how the structure of retributivist
punishment leads to under-deterrence of crime. Specifically, it highlights
how the factors involved in determining punishment under retributivism are
affected by cognitive biases. Part VI then acknowledges that the same
behavioral psychology research challenges utilitarianism's attempt to create
sufficient and optimal ex ante incentives. However, while utilitarianism
without any adjustment for cognitive biases leads to a one-time under-
deterrent effect, limiting retributivism essentially creates a "double" under-
deterrent effect. Because of this double effect, limiting retributivism's
appeal to utilitarianism fails. Thus, based on this behavioral psychology
research, utilitarian goals of punishment, and deterrence in particular, are
best served through a purely utilitarian theory of punishment. Finally, this
Part provides insights into how utilitarian punishment may be improved
through the use of behavioral psychology research.
II. BACKGROUND
Retributive and utilitarian theories of criminal punishment are the two
predominant theories of punishment discussed today.2' The two theories
are often thought of as the two opposing concepts of what criminal
punishment should be.22 The debate between the two camps is by no means
a recent phenomenon. It has evolved over hundreds of years and will
probably continue to advance over the next hundred years.23 But before we
address the history and development of this debate, it is necessary here to
give a quick synopsis of each theory.
A. RETRIBUTIVISM
Retributivism posits that punishment is necessary because society must
engage in some form of retribution against those who violate its laws.24 Its
central tenet defines punishment as society's response to a criminal action
that has occurred in the past. 5 The value of the punishment of the crime is
21 DRESSLER, supra note 17, at 19.
22 See id.
23 See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 6.
24 See GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT §§ 90-104
(T.M. Knox trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1978) (1821); see also KANT, supra note 14, at 196
(describing retaliation as the only principle capable of determining "the quality and quantity
of a just penalty").
25 See R.A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 4 (1986) (noting that retributivism "find[s]
the sense and justification of punishment in its relation to a past offence").
2009]
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in the punishment itself;26 when someone has committed a crime, they
simply deserve to be punished.27 "Punishment that gives an offender what
he or she deserves for a past crime is a valuable end in itself and needs no
further justification."28 Furthermore, society is morally obligated to punish
wrongdoers2 9
B. UTILITARIANISM
Utilitarian theories of criminal punishment stem from general
utilitarian concepts. Joshua Dressier suggests that "[t]he purpose of all laws
is to maximize the net happiness of society." 30  Therefore, punishment
should only be administered if it results in an overall benefit to society.31
Only when punishment leads to more aggregate pleasure than aggregate
pain is punishment justified.32 As John Robinson and John Darley argue,
"Punishment for a past offense is [only] justified by the future benefits it
provides., 33 In this manner, utilitarian theories are sometimes referred to as
"consequentialist" because they are concerned solely with how punishment
will affect future actions and with society's future aggregate happiness.34
Punishment can do this in two main ways. First, it can deter future
criminals from committing crimes; second, it can either incapacitate




The history of these two theories of punishment is extensive. Each has
enjoyed the support of legal scholars and intellectual giants, and each has
36had its periods of dominance. While the specifics of the theories may
have changed over the years, their foundations have remained constant.
Retributivism has always been concerned with punishing criminals as
26 See Stanley I. Benn, Punishment, in 7 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 29, 30 (Paul
Edwards ed., 1967) ("[T]he punishment of crime is right in itself .....
27 See id.
28 Robinson & Darley, supra note 6, at 454.
29 See John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 5 (1955).
30 DRESSLER, supra note 17, at 14.
31 See BENTHAM, MORALS AND LEGISLATION, supra note 15, at 83-84.
32 See id.
33 Robinson & Darley, supra note 6, at 454.
34 See Christopher, supra note 6, at 848 ("Consequentialist theories justify
punishment.,. on the actual, good consequences that are attained, for example, deterrence
of a crime .... ).
35 Robinson & Darley, supra note 6, at 453.
36 See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 6.
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simple punishment for their crimes, 37 while utilitarianism has valued the
punishment of criminals because of the benefit society may reap as a result
of such punishment.38
Retributivism can trace its origins far into the past. 39 From the time of
antiquity through the middle-ages, many criminal justice systems were
based largely on the concept of retributivism-the criminal getting what he
or she deserved.40 Indeed, retributivism can be seen in biblical and
Talmudic forms of justice. 41 The existence of early forms of retributivism
is not surprising when one considers the emotional aspects of this theory-
punishment based in large part on a feeling that the perpetrator deserves the
punishment.42
But retributivism was not solely a legal or emotional justification for
punishment. It was also justified on moral and philosophical grounds.43
Arguing in support of these justifications for punishment, Immanuel Kant
wrote that "[p]unishment can never be administered merely as a means for
promoting another Good .... ,,44 On the contrary, "Punishment ought to be
pronounced over all criminals proportionate to their internal wickedness. ' 45
In this sense retributive punishment could be thought of as a moral or
ideological and philosophical need to condemn wrongdoers. Hegel
provided an even more comprehensive justification of retributivism. 46 He
concluded that crimes needed to be negated in order to re-establish
equivalence in society, and that negation could only be achieved through
punishment.47  Retribution was the link between the crime and the
punishment.48
37 See infra text accompanying notes 39-48.
38 See BENTHAM, MORALS AND LEGISLATION, supra note 15, at 83.
39 See IGOR PRIMORATZ, JUSTIFYING LEGAL PUNISHMENT 12 (1989).
40 See id.
41 Id. at 13 ("The history of the retributive view of punishment begins with the biblical
and [T]almudic ethical and legal ideas.").
42 Cf. PRIMORATZ, supra note 39, at 13 (describing the moral aspect of retributive
punishment, which this Comment posits will often equate to an emotional aspect of
retributive punishment).
43 See id.
44 KANT, supra note 14, at 195.
45 IMMANUEL KANT, THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT (1790), reprinted in 42 GREAT BOOKS OF THE
WESTERN WORLD: KANT 447 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1989).
46 See Markus Dirk Dubber, Rediscovering Hegel's Theory of Crime and Punishment, 92
MICH. L. REV. 1577, 1577-78 (1994).
47 Id. at 1581-82.
48 HEGEL, supra note 24, at § 101.
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Utilitarian theories of punishment, while perhaps not as old as
retributivism, may also date back several millennia.49  While early
retributivism may have called for a thief to have his or her hand cut off
(also potentially a utilitarian response), it is possible that a decision to
imprison the thief instead of, or in addition to, cutting off his or her hand
reflected utilitarian values. After all, the utilitarian principle of
incapacitation asserts that while in prison, the thief is no threat. Seen in this
light, utilitarian concepts may date back almost to the beginnings of
civilization. Indeed, utilitarian justifications for punishment can be seen as
early as in the work of Plato. In Protagoras, Plato argued that punishment
for punishment's sake was "taking blind vengeance like a beast., 50  He
continued, "No, punishment is not inflicted by a rational man for the sake of
the crime that has been committed-after all one cannot undo what is
past ..."51
The medieval and early modem eras witnessed the continued
development of utilitarian thought. St. Thomas Aquinas argued that the
purpose of punishment required that some good emerge from the
52punishment. Later in the millennium, Thomas Hobbes indicated support
for utilitarian forms and rationales of punishment. He argued that society
should be "forbidden to inflict punishment with any other design[], than for
the correction of the offender, or direction of others., 53 The utilitarian
rationale in this statement appears undeniable.
Yet it was not until the writings of Jeremy Bentham in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries that utilitarianism was most clearly articulated.54
Although it was John Stewart Mill who actually coined the term
utilitarianism to describe the doctrine,55 it was Jeremy Bentham who first
proposed his theory that society's goal should be to maximize utility, that
is, to maximize the amount of aggregate pleasure and minimize the amount
49 A more recent example can be seen in the work of John Locke. LOCKE, supra note 5,
at 273 (noting that a crime may be punished for future restraint).
50 PLATO, PROTAGORAS, reprinted in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 308, 321
(Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1982) (stating that punishment is permissible if
"the [punisher's] intention be directed chiefly to some good, to be obtained by means of the
punishment of the person who has sinned").
51 Id.
52 II ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, in 20 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN
WORLD, second part, part I, question 92, art. 2, at 215 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed.,
founders ed. 1952) ("And it is the fear of punishment that law makes use of in order to
ensure obedience ....").
" HOBBES, supra note 5, at 106.
54 See BENTHAM, MORALS AND LEGISLATION, supra note 15, at 83-86.
55 JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (Oskar Piest ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1957)
(1861).
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of aggregate pain in society.56 Criminal punishment, therefore, was only
acceptable if it increased future pleasure or decreased future pain. Using
his theory of utility, Bentham was the first to clearly argue that prevention
of future crimes should be the primary goal of punishment. "General
prevention ought to be the chief end of punishment, as it is its real
justification., 57  Because criminal acts decrease aggregate happiness in
society, prevention of such acts increases aggregate happiness.
The influence of Bentham's and others' works on utilitarianism and
their influences on the criminal justice system cannot be overstated.
Bentham, in particular, accurately touched on all the issues mentioned by
previous academics and philosophers, and weaved those concerns into a
comprehensive and conclusive theory that could be applied to life in
general.58
Following Bentham, we see the emergence of applications of
utilitarian principles of punishment by prominent legal scholars.59 Several
famous American scholars and judges adopted and further developed
utilitarian theories of punishment. Oliver Wendall Holmes, Jr., for
example, wrote in 1881 that "prevention would.., seem to be the chief and
only universal purpose of punishment., 60 He openly supported deterrence
as a chief principle of punishment:
If I were having a philosophical talk with a man I was going to have hanged .... I
should say, I don't doubt that your act was inevitable for you but to make it more
avoidable by others we propose to sacrifice you to the common good. You may
regard yourself as a soldier dying for your country if you like. But the law must keep
its promises.
6 1
John H. Wigmore described deterrence as "the kingpin of the criminal
law. 62
As the twentieth century progressed, the movement towards utilitarian
theories of punishment grew in its influence.63 Even the Supreme Court
56 See BENTHAM, MORALS AND LEGISLATION, supra note 15, at 1-13.
57 BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF PENAL LAW, supra note 15, at 396.
58 See PRIMORATZ, supra note 39, at 13.
59 See infra text accompanying notes 60-62.
60 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 46 (Little, Brown & Co. 1945)
(1881).
61 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Harold J. Laski (Dec 17, 1925), in 1
HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND HAROLD J.
LASKI, 1916-1925, at 806 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953).
62 Harry Olson, Homer Cummings & John H. Wigmore, A Symposium of Comments from
the Legal Profession: The Loeb-Leopold Case (Concluded), 15 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 395, 401 (1924).
63 However, this period can be differentiated between adoptions of rehabilitation and
deterrence as governing theories. See Alschuler, supra note 6, at 6-14.
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appeared to have found the virtues of the philosophy. In 1949, the Court
held that "[r]etribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal
law."64 Three years later the Court spoke of the "tardy and unfinished
substitution of deterrence and reformation in place of retaliation and
vengeance as the motivation of public prosecution. '65
The latter half of the twentieth century saw a continued development
of utilitarian principles that nicely dovetailed into the philosophy of the
emerging law and economics movement. 66 This movement sought to craft
legal rules that created ex ante incentives that would lead to efficient
outcomes in a variety of situations. 67  The utilitarian concepts of using
criminal punishments to decrease the amount of future crime through
deterrence played right into the law and economics movement and its use of
ex ante incentives to create optimal care and activity levels.68 By creating a
bright-line rule of harsh punishments, potential criminals are incentivized
not to commit a crime.69
As discussed above, during this period incapacitation and deterrence
became important goals of the criminal justice system.7° Professor Albert
Alschuler highlights the use of law-and-economics-based deterrence
policies during the period with the example of federal income tax evasion
penalties. 71 Even though physically stealing $100,000, for example, from
the government would appear to most of us as worse than avoiding paying
$100,000 worth of income tax, income tax evasion was punished much
more severely than outright theft.72 The justification was that tax evaders
were caught less often than thieves; therefore, harsher penalties were
necessary to create a sufficient deterrent effect.73
As the twentieth century wore on, utilitarian justifications for
punishment seemed to be gaining a foothold in American criminal
jurisprudence.7 4 Yet this blossoming of acceptance of utilitarian concepts
64 Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949).
65 Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952).
66 Cf Alschuler, supra note 6, at 11 (noting economists' views on criminal punishment).
67 See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary
Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1232 (1985).
68 See id.
69 See id.
70 See Alschuler, supra note 6, at 11.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 11 n.61 ("Especially in light of the limited number of criminal tax prosecutions
relative to the estimated incidence of such violations ... deterring others from violating the
tax laws is the primary consideration underlying these guidelines." (citing U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS § 2T4.1 (April 1987))).
74 Id. at 9-12.
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of punishment was not to last. A "renaissance" of retributivist thought was
soon to challenge utilitarian theory.75 This recent movement towards
retributivism as the predominant school of American criminal jurisprudence
is discussed in the next Part.
III. MODERN RETRIBUTIVISM
As recently as the middle to late twentieth century, many scholars and
judges were still under the assumption that retributive theories of
punishment had either been thoroughly defeated or served little to no
purpose in the criminal justice system.76 In 1972, Justice Thurgood
Marshall declared that "no one has ever seriously advanced retribution as a
legitimate goal of our society."" A criminal law scholar in the 1950s
claimed that "[p]unishment as retribution belongs to a penal philosophy that
is archaic and discredited by history. '7 8  Even the drafters of the Model
Penal Code seemed to virtually ignore the role of retributivism in criminal
punishment. 79 The 1962 draft included retribution as a limiting principle
while seemingly including every other plausible justification as a legitimate
and primary rationale and purpose for punishment.80 In such a hostile
atmosphere, a reemergence of retributivism seemed highly unlikely; yet,
exactly such a reemergence has occurred, and with great strength and
influence.
8 1
Over the last quarter of the twentieth century and into the early part of
the twenty-first century, retributivism has reestablished itself as the
dominant theory behind criminal justice.82 That this revolution in thought
about criminal punishment has occurred is disputed by few scholars8 3 and
can be seen in a plethora of examples. 84 One scholar noted that "[t]here has
been a steady rise in the popularity of retributivism over the last decade,
75 See Martin R. Gardner, The Renaissance of Retribution-An Examination of Doing
Justice, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 781, 781.
76 See supra text accompanying notes 63-75; infra text accompanying notes 77-80.
77 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 363 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
78 Austin MacCormick, The Prison's Role in Crime Prevention, 41 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 36, 40 (1951).
79 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
80 Id.
81 See Christopher, supra note 6, at 845-47.
82 id.
83 But see Gerald Leonard, Towards a Legal History of American Criminal Theory:
Culture and Doctrine from Blackstone to the Model Penal Code, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 691,
692 n.6 (2003) (arguing that there has not been a revolution of retributivist thinking).
84 See Christopher, supra note 6, at 845; Gardener, supra note 75, at 784; Ristroph, supra
note 6, at 1293.
2009]
MA TTHE W HAIST
which is surprising given its near death in the 1950s and 1960s. ' '85 Such
sentiments are seen through the works of several other criminal law
scholars.86
These scholarly insights about the reemergence of retributivism were
based on strong examples in a number of contexts. In Spaziano v. Florida,
the United States Supreme Court acknowledged the role of retribution in
criminal justice.87 The Court stated that retribution "is an element of all
punishments society imposes.' 8 State courts, too, adopted a more
retributivist slant when interpreting criminal punishment statutes.
89
Additionally, several states adopted retributivist principles of punishment
into their penal codes. 90 Pennsylvania's penal code went so far as openly
advocating retribution as the primary purpose of criminal punishment: "The
sentencing guidelines provide sanctions proportionate to the severity of the
crime [that] ... establishes a sentencing system with a primary focus on
retribution .... ,91
While the specific event that triggered the reemergence of
retributivism is highly debated, the reasons for its reemergence are more
agreed upon. 92 Although several reasons existed for the growth, three are
predominant. First, retributivism altered its rhetoric away from talk of
retribution and towards criminals getting their just deserts.93 In other
words, retributivism no longer spoke of victims or society taking vengeance
on the criminal, but instead spoke of the criminal getting what he or she
deserved for committing the crime. Second, retributivism received a
facelift in the form of much scholarly development of its concepts and
philosophical arguments and justifications.94 This development helped
modernize retributivist thought and moved retributivism away from its
85 Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution,
39 UCLA L. Rev. 1659, 1659 (1992).
86 See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, Limiting Retributivism, in THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT
83, 90-104 (Michael Tonry ed., 2004); Gardener, supra note 75, at 784; Kyron Huigens, The
Dead End of Deterrence, and Beyond, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943, 980 n.152 (2000);
Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An Opinionated Review, 87 CAL. L. REV.
943, 978 (1999).
87 468 U.S. 447, 462 (1984).
88 Id.
89 See Michelle Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an
Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1326-27 (2000)
(citing examples of state courts adopting retributivist rationales for criminal punishment).
90 See, e.g., Act Operative July 1, 1977, ch. 4.5, 1976 Cal. Stat. 5140 (codified as
amended at CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(1) (West 2004 & Supp. 2009)).
91 204 PA. CODE § 303.11 (2008).
92 Christopher, supra note 6, at 846 n.6.
93 See Ristroph, supra note 6, at 1299-1301.
9' See id. at 1299-1300.
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archaic image of an "eye for an eye" punishment.95 Lastly, many
retributivists developed and adopted new systems of retributivism that
attempted to appeal to other theories of punishment.96 For purposes of this
Comment, I focus on limiting retributivism's appeal to utilitarianism, and
will now discuss the three developments in great detail.
The rhetoric of retributivism had always been one of its weakest
points.97 A system that speaks of the basis of punishment in terms of
vengeance is bound to evoke bad connotations similar to reactions towards
vigilante justice. 98  This rhetoric leads to retributivism being
"portray[ed] ... as glorified vengeance, [a] celebrat[ed] and
codiflied]... brutal and inhumane impulse to harm those who harm us."
99
In response to these negative images associated with the term retribution,
retributivism scholars have adopted less severe and more egalitarian-
sounding rhetoric. 100 The newly chosen motto was 'just deserts." When a
person commits a crime, his or her actions deserve punishment in
accordance with the severity of the crime and his or her moral culpability.'01
This change in rhetoric has largely achieved its goals.10 2  "The
emphasis on desert seems to have helped disassociate retribution from
revenge, for it allows punishment theorists to draw on a concept that has
more neutral philosophical status."'10 3  Thus, instead of being punished
because of revenge or hatred, the criminal receives his or her just deserts as
punishment. 104
This change in rhetoric accompanied a change in retributivism's
underlying philosophy as well. 10 5  While opinions differ within the
philosophy of modem retributivism, there is consistency in the emergence
of the use of egalitarian principles within those theories. 
106
9' See id. at 1299-1306.
96 See id.
97 See id.
98 See id. at 1298-99.
99 Id. at 1299.
100 Id.
101 See Frase, supra note 6, at 73 (citing ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS
29-33 (1993); Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the
Eighth Amendment: "Proportionality" Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 571, 590
(2005)).
102 See supra text accompanying notes 81-86.
103 Ristroph, supra note 6, at 1300.
'04 See id.
105 See Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, in SENTENCING, supra note 19, at 93.




Herbert Morris was one of the pioneering supporters of the new
theoretical basis for retributivism. 10 7  Morris argued that the law should
create equal rights and responsibilities for all members of society. °8 When
an individual commits a crime, the perpetrator violates this equal
distribution." 9 The criminal receives the benefit of others not committing
crimes, but violates his responsibility not to commit crimes against
others. 110 Punishment, therefore, is simply society restoring the balances of
benefits and burdens of the law.1 11
Other retributivists consider a criminal act to consist of the criminal
declaring he is more important than the victim. 112 By delivering just deserts
as punishment, society signals that the criminal is not, in fact, more
valuable than the victim, demonstrating the victim's equality through the
punishment of the criminal."13
Lastly, retributivists attempted to reconcile retributivism with
utilitarianism to gain adherents among traditional supporters of utilitarian
theories of punishment." 4  While, historically, retributivism and
utilitarianism were viewed as diametrically opposed and mutually exclusive
theories of punishment, late twentieth century scholars were able to create a
system that bridged the gap. 115
The most influential of these scholars was Norval Morris, not to be
confused with Herbert Morris. 116  Morris established the limiting
retributivism model of criminal punishment. 1 7 Limiting retributivism did
not follow the typical retributivist concept that punishment should be based
and predicated on a criminal getting his or her just deserts."18  Instead,
desert and moral blameworthiness served as a limiting principle, "a
principle that, though it would rarely tell us the exact sanction to be
107 See Morris, supra note 105, at 93-95.
108 id.
109 Id.
10 Id. at 95 ("[I]t is just to punish those who have violated the rules and caused the unfair
distribution of benefits and burdens. A person who violates the rules has something others
have-the benefits of the system-but by renouncing what others have assumed, the burdens
of self-restraint, he has acquired an unfair advantage.").
111 See WOJCIECH SADURSKI, GIVING DESERT ITS DUE: SOCIAL JUSTICE AND LEGAL
THEORY 229 (1985).
112 See, e.g., Jean Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND
ITS CRITICS 1,5-6 (Wesley Cragg ed., 1992).
' Id. at 6-11.
114 See, e.g., Morris, supra note 19, at 257-59.
115 See DRESSLER, supra note 17, at 19.
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imposed.., would nevertheless give us the outer limits of leniency and
severity which should not be excluded." ' 19 Despite the fact that Morris
used retributivism as a limiting principle, his theory can still be seen as
located squarely within the retributivist camp of theories of punishment.
Morris acknowledged the fundamental difficulties in determining with
precision a prisoner's just deserts. Instead, retributivism would often lead
to a range of possible penalties. 120 While we can be sure that some penalty
is either too little or too much, we cannot always know exactly what the
correct retributivist penalty should be.12' This leads to Morris's use of
retributivism as a limiting principle instead of a guiding principle, as
mentioned above.1
22
Within the range of penalties dictated by retributivism's limiting
principles, other theories of criminal punishment are utilized to increase or
decrease the sentence to achieve those theories' goals. 123 One such theory,
supported strongly by Morris himself, was "parsimony," which essentially
held that a criminal's punishment should be no more severe than needed.
24
This served as a further limiting principle that had to be addressed before
any other considerations could result in an increase or decrease in
punishment within the acceptable range. For this Comment, however, the
most important theory to which Morris's limited retributivism attempted to
appeal was utilitarianism.
Limiting retributivism appealed to utilitarian concerns in two main
ways. First, and of lesser concern, it created increased uniformity in
sentences, which was believed to be of utilitarian value. 125 More uniform
sentences would create a clear indication of the level of punishment that a
criminal would receive and thus was thought to have a deterrent effect.
126
Second, and more importantly, within sentence parameters a judge could
factor in utilitarian concerns such as incapacitation or deterrence to increase
or decrease the severity of the sentence. 127  Thus, "desert permits the
reasonable pursuit of utilitarian aims even as it forestalls the dangers of
"9 Id. at 259.
120 id.
121 See Ristroph, supra note 6, at 1301-02 (noting that "[t]he 'limiting retributivism'
model attributed to Norval Morris begins with the recognition that our intuitions about how
much punishment a given offender deserves are often imprecise").
122 See, e.g., HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 66 (1968) ("I
see an important limiting principle in the criminal law's traditional emphasis on
blameworthiness .... But it is a limiting principle, not a justification for action.").
123 See Morris, supra note 19, at 264.
124 See NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 60-62 (1974).
125 See Frase, supra note 6, at 74-75.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 76-77.
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excessive utilitarianism."' 2 8  In light of these developments, Norval
Morris's theory of limiting retributivism seemed to succeed at bridging the
gap between retributivism and utilitarianism.
As a result of its ability to appeal to both retributivism and
utilitarianism, limiting retributivism became a widely accepted theory of
criminal punishment.1 29  Some sentencing guidelines, where theories of
criminal punishment are put to practice, are evidence of such acceptance.
Some of the guidelines, Minnesota's for example, seem to be adopting
limiting retributivism as their guiding principles. 130
IV. LIMITING RETRIBUTIVISM
Because of its extreme success, 131 limiting retributivism is the model
of retributivism I will focus on in the remaining portions of this Comment.
Here, a more detailed description of limiting retributivism is necessary to
highlight how it functions in practice, how it specifically appeals to
utilitarianism, and what factors are involved in determining the upper and
lower bounds of acceptable levels of punishment.
As previously mentioned, limiting retributivism seeks to create a
system of criminal punishment in which retributivist principles determine
upper and lower limits of a criminal's potential range of punishment.1 32
The criminal's culpability and moral blameworthiness are the relevant
factors in assessing the upper and lower limits of punishment.133  While
determining an appropriate, specific punishment may create difficulties for
scholars and practitioners, creating a range of possible punishments is
easier, although not without its own difficulties.
Professor Martin Redish claims that when interpreting constitutional
text, you may not always know when your interpretation is the correct one,
but you do know when it is the wrong one. 134 The text provides a range of
128 Ristroph, supra note 6, at 1302.
129 One scholar noted that limiting retributivism has become a "widely endorsed and
adopted model." Frase, supra note 6, at 76. Another stated that it is "[o]ne of the most
widely followed reconciliations of desert with utilitarian aims." Ristroph, supra note 6, at
1301.
130 Minnesota's sentencing guidelines seem to have adopted limiting retributivism to
some degree. See Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota: 1978-2003, 31
CRIME & JUST. 131, 149 (2005) ("Thus, for most defendants, the guidelines essentially retain
the traditional indeterminate sentencing system and its utilitarian values, subject only to
retributive 'caps' set by the presumptive duration of stayed prison terms.").
131 See Frase, supra note 6, at 76; Ristroph, supra note 6, at 1301.
132 See supra text accompanying notes 116-24.
133 ANDREw VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 69 (1976).
134 See Martin H. Redish & Karen L. Drizin, Constitutional Federalism and Judicial
Review: The Role of Textual Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 22 (1987) (citing Frederick
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possible interpretations, and it should be quite clear when you have
exceeded that range. 35 This same idea can apply to creating an acceptable
range of punishments for a criminal. You cannot always know if a certain
punishment is correct, but you can know if it is either too severe or too
lenient. If a criminal steals a car, we intuitively know that a one-day prison
sentence is far too low, while a fifty-year sentence is far too high. Yet we
may not know if a ten-year or a fifteen-year sentence is more appropriate.136
While upper and lower limits can be very roughly determined through
intuitive retributivist beliefs given a specific crime, how do we determine
different ranges of punishments from one type of crime to another? In other
words, how do limiting retributivists determine that an appropriate range of
punishments for theft is one to five years, for example, while an appropriate
range for rape is ten to twenty? The answer is much the same as how
limiting retributivists determine the appropriate range for a single crime:
there are intuitive sensibilities about punishments. There is a general belief
that some crimes are more morally reprehensible than others.1 37 People
tend to agree that rape is a far more reprehensible crime than mere theft.
These general beliefs about the varying degrees of reprehensibility of
crimes are supported by empirical evidence.138 Almost all people, across all
groups, when asked to rank crimes from least-worst to worst, rank them in
similar manners.139 This evidence bolsters limiting retributivism's appeal to
intuition to create upper and lower limits by demonstrating that such
intuition is inherent in human nature and, therefore, in some sense, not
arbitrary. Although the fact that differing crimes receive different levels of
punishment seems obvious, it is still important to note that the range of
punishment from crime A to crime B is justified in a similar manner as that
of ranges of potential punishments within a single type of crime. Both
differences are based on moral culpability. This fact can be seen in the
Model Penal Code, which ranks crimes and states of required knowledge,
implying differing levels of moral culpability for each mens rea140
Once we have accepted that limiting retributivism can successfully
create a range of acceptable punishments, we are faced with how utilitarian
Schauer, An Essay on Constitutional Language, 29 UCLA L. REV. 797, 828 (1982)).
135 See id.
136 This example is taken from Ristroph, supra note 6, at 1302.
137 Cf VON HIRSCH, supra note 133, at 66-71 (arguing that the existence of differing
punishments for different crimes implies that certain crimes are worse than others).
138 Joseph E. Jacoby & Francis T. Cullen, The Structure of Punishment Norms: Applying
the Rossi-Berk Model, 89 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 245 (1998).
139 Id.
140 See Kevin R. Reitz, Reporter's Introduction to MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING 1,
3-4 (Discussion Draft 2006).
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principles may be met and goals achieved within those ranges. Here,
utilitarian concepts such as incapacitation or deterrence are utilized.' 4 ' The
judge or sentencing guidelines determine the range of punishments
available for certain crimes, given the type of crime and the criminal's
culpability and moral blameworthiness, and then utilitarian concerns are
used to determine the adequate punishment within that range.
42
According to supporters of limiting retributivism, these adoptions of
utilitarian principles can have demonstrable effects and thus serve utilitarian
purposes. 143 Limiting retributivism's use of utilitarian principles can serve
utilitarianism's twin goals of incapacitation and deterrence; examples of
each follow.
Suppose a person has robbed a grocery store. The upper and lower
bounds for this theft are one to ten years. The trial judge discovers that this
individual has been previously convicted of theft, assault, and attempted
robbery, and received jail terms of one year, six months, and one year,
respectively. Given this individual's demonstrated propensity to commit
crime, utilitarians consider this criminal a threat to society-that is to say,
the criminal's demonstrated propensity to commit crimes indicates he is
likely to commit future crimes and thus is bound to cause pain to others.
Therefore, society will be better off if this individual is put in jail for a long
time where he cannot hurt others. Thus, with these considerations in mind,
a judge may sentence this individual to ten years in prison, the maximum
allowed. This same logic is behind the "three strikes and you're out" rule
of many state penal codes. 144 This example is a clear demonstration of an
appeal to incapacitation principles of utilitarianism.
Now let us consider another hypothetical. An individual is convicted
of attempted rape. The range of acceptable punishments for attempted rape
is two to twenty years. Let us also assume that this crime was committed in
a state or county where it was known that a very low percentage of rape or
attempted rape victims took actions against their perpetrators and pursued
criminal charges. In this regard, a very low percentage of people
committing rape or attempted rape end up being charged with the crime,
and an even lower percentage will be found guilty and sentenced to a term
of imprisonment. In light of this low rate, a very high level of punishment
may be required to create sufficiently strong incentives that will convince
potential rapists that they should not commit the crime. Simple economic
calculations support this statement. If there is a 10% chance of being found
141 See MORRIs, supra note 124, at 60-62.
142 See id.; see also Frase, supra note 6, at 76-77 (explaining the concept of limiting
retributivism and Morris's role in its development).
143 See MORRIS, supra note 124, at 60-62.
144 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL. CODE § 667(e)(2) (West 1999).
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guilty and an expected jail time of five years, then the expected harm to the
rapist is a six-month jail sentence. On the other hand, if the expected jail
time is twenty years, the expected harm is a two-year sentence. According
to simple law and economic principles, the higher expected harm will create
greater incentives not to commit the crime. 45 Given this information, the
judge decides to award twenty years in an attempt to demonstrate to the
community that one found guilty of attempted rape will face twenty years
imprisonment. 146 This decision to sentence one found guilty of rape or
attempted rape to the highest possible prison term, according to the law and
economics theory previously mentioned, creates stronger incentives not to
commit rapes, and therefore serves as a deterrent, the other main goal of
utilitarianism.147 This example demonstrates limiting retributivism's appeal
to deterrence.
But this leaves us with our last, and, as we will see, most important
question. Retributivists claim that the level of culpability and moral
blameworthiness of the offender determines the upper and lower bounds of
permissible punishment.148  This seems simple enough, yet how are
culpability and moral blameworthiness quantified? I cannot imagine a
retributivist would ever claim that a man with Down syndrome was as
culpable or morally abject for committing assault as a full-grown man with
average intellect. Neither, I imagine, would a retributivist say the
permissible range of punishments should be the same for a young child who
commits theft as for an adult. The question is then: what factors are utilized
when determining the upper and lower bounds of permissible punishment,
given the fact that people committing the same crime may have varying
degrees of culpability and moral blameworthiness?
Scholars and judges have dealt with this problem by viewing desert on
a case-specific basis. 149 By looking at the specifics of each case, the judge
can determine the most appropriate range of punishment in line with the
defendant's culpability and moral blameworthiness, and the severity of the
crime. 50 "Desert is typically understood to be a highly individual matter, in
the sense that to be deserving or not is dependent on particular traits of the
individual."' 151 One scholar goes as far as describing desert as based "as
145 See Shavell, supra note 67, at 1235.
146 This example is similar to the federal income tax evasion example mentioned supra,
in the text accompanying notes 70-73.
147 See Shavell, supra note 67, at 1235.
148 See generally Ristroph, supra note 6.





much or more on circumstances and personal characteristics as on physical
actions and harm."' 1
52
Several commentators have acknowledged that each individual's
desert may differ greatly. 53 Various conditions or situations exist that may
increase or decrease a criminal's culpability and moral blameworthiness,
and hence alter his or her desert. 154 Such factors range from mental ability
to age. 155  I refer to these issues of personal characteristics and
circumstances as "aggravating" and "mitigating" factors. An aggravating
factor is any factor that increases a criminal's desert, while a mitigating
factor is any factor that decreases a criminal's desert. While the academic
discussion of the list of possible aggravating and mitigating factors is
nowhere near complete, I posit that based on the underlying structure of
retributivism and its dependency on moral blameworthiness, that list will be
lengthy.
Aggravating and mitigating factors play a large role in determining a
criminal's just desert. For example, how blameworthy is a poor baker
stealing bread from his employer to feed his family? What about a situation
in which a man thinks his actions are saving the lives of many, yet actually
result in several deaths? Or a ten-year-old child who accidentally shoots
and kills his sister? Most would not argue that these three people are just as
morally culpable and blameworthy as those who stole or murdered in cold
blood, for fun or revenge. I believe these three situations illustrate how
many factors could be used to alter the range of potential punishments
under a limiting retributivism theory of punishment.' 
56
In conclusion, limiting retributivism, in its current form, consists of
determining a range of potential punishments by utilizing all the various
aggravating and mitigating factors that affect the defendant's moral
culpability, and then altering the punishment within those parameters to
serve utilitarian purposes. As we will see in the following Part, this system
152 Alschuler, supra note 6, at 19.
153 See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, Justice and Personal Desert, in DOING AND DESERVING:
ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 55, 61 (1970).
154 See, e.g., Kadish, supra note 86.
155 See Ristroph, supra note 6, at 1314-27.
156 Although I have not seen any scholarly writings that have argued this point, I believe
it is a natural and logical progression of the concept of retributivism in general. Given that
moral blameworthiness and culpability are what defines an individual's desert, I cannot see
how the examples I illustrated would not affect one's level of desert. In order to preclude
such factors from entering the debate of what the individual's just deserts are, retributivists
will need to create a different rationale or measuring stick for desert. A possibility could be
having some sort of free will requirement, in other words, describing moral blameworthiness
as being able to understand the import of your decision, its likely outcome, yet nonetheless
going forward with the action.
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is questionable because the existence of so many aggravating and
mitigating factors itself will lead to severe under-deterrence, due to the
effects of cognitive biases. Regardless of the resulting adjustments for
utilitarian concerns within the acceptable range of punishments, the overall
deterrent effect of this system is inadequate. The following Part describes
why utilitarian concerns about deterrence and ex ante incentives are not
adequately addressed by limiting retributivism.
V. LIMITING RETRIBUTIVISM, UTILITARIANISM, AND COGNITIVE BIASES
Over the past several decades, behavioral psychologists have made
numerous discoveries that have questioned previous assumptions about
human behavior. 157 These discoveries have questioned the neo-classical
image of human beings as rational beings capable of making well-informed,
reasoned decisions. 158 In contrast to the optimal rational behavior humans
were imagined to possess, they "exhibit bounded rationality, bounded self-
interest, and bounded willpower." 159 In other words, human psychology
and behavior prevent people from acting or behaving as entirely rational
beings, as they have often been thought to be. With these new insights into
the true nature of human psychology, several old theories, specifically
theories of criminal punishment, must be adjusted to accommodate this new
information.
In essence, behavioral psychologists have discovered over the past
several decades what many already thought to be true: human beings simply
are not rational.16° Yet research has shown that the extent to which human
beings are irrational, and the impact of this irrational behavior, is far greater
than previously predicted. 16 1 Errors in human judgment are not simply the
effect of emotion creeping into the decision-making process and
temporarily overriding the individual's rationality; rather, they are the effect
157 Ironically, the decision to engage in such research was, in large part, a reaction to the
law and economics movement's description of human beings as rational decision-makers.
See William M. Goldstein & Robin M. Hogarth, Judgment and Decision Research: Some
Historical Context, in RESEARCH ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 3, 5 (William M.
Goldstein & Robin M. Hogarth eds., 1997); Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder,
Introduction to RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY
1, 5 (Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1987).
158 See supra note 157.
159 Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471, 1471 (1998).
160 Id. at 1473.
161 Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of
Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 633 (1999).
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of systematic cognitive biases that affect all of human nature. 162 Studies
have demonstrated that human beings are, in many ways, fundamentally
irrational. By demonstrating the existence of such cognitive biases as the
hindsight bias, 163 the entity effect, 164 and the representative heuristic effect,
behavioral psychologists have demonstrated just how irrational we are.165
Hindsight bias refers to the phenomenon in which human beings, once
knowledgeable of the outcome of some situation, develop a sincere belief
that they would have predicted the actual outcome. 166 This may seem like
common sense-hindsight is 20/20-yet the extent of this bias is
remarkable. Suppose a patient comes into a hospital with a set of
symptoms. Doctors know that given these symptoms, there is a 33%
chance the patient has disease A, a 33% chance that the patient has disease
B, and a 33% chance that the patient has disease C. Before actual
diagnosis, several doctors, knowledgeable about all three diseases and their
symptoms, are asked the probability that a patient with this set of symptoms
has each of the three diseases. Virtually every doctor will say there is a
33% chance that the patient has each disease. The doctors are then
presented with a description of a patient with the exact same symptoms, but
told the patient had disease B. They are then asked, if they had seen this
patient before he was diagnosed, what would be the predicted probability of
the patient having each of the three diseases. In one study of the hindsight
bias, the doctors claimed they would have predicted disease B was more
than 50% likely to be the cause of the patient's symptoms. Clearly, the
responses in both situations should be the same-33% for each disease-
yet the results were not so.' 6 7 The doctors all exhibited hindsight biases.
The practical effect of this bias on the legal world is huge. How should we
view an expert doctor's testimony at a medical malpractice suit with the
effect of hindsight bias in mind?
168
162 j. St B.T. Evans, Bias and Rationality, in RATIONALITY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 6, 6 (K.I. Manktelow & D.E. Over eds., 1993) (noting that
humans exhibit "a whole range of systematic errors and biases").
163 See, e.g., Hal R. Arkes et al., Eliminating the Hindsight Bias, 73 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
302, 305 (1988).
164 See, e.g., Lee Ross et al., Perseverance in Self-Perception and Social Perception:
Biased Attributional Processes in the Debriefing Paradigm, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 880, 882-83 (1975) (referring to the "entity effect" as the perseverance
phenomenon).
165 See, e.g., SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 142-79, 245-94
(2d ed. 1991) (1984).
166 See Arkes et al., supra note 163, at 305.
167 See id. at 305, 306 tbl.1.
168 See, e.g., Susan J. LaBine & Gary LaBine, Determinations of Negligence and the
Hindsight Bias, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 501, 510-11 (1996).
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The entity effect is another example of a cognitive bias that affects
human decision-making. 169  Research in this field demonstrates that if
humans are presented with a hypothetical situation and a set of related facts,
they will continue to maintain their belief in a conclusion drawn based on
the facts even after they have learned that those facts are false. Thus, if
given a set of facts and then asked to create a hypothesis based on those
facts, even if those facts are later proved to be entirely false, people still
hold on to their initial hypotheses and fundamentally believe it is correct.
This tendency is called the entity effect.170
Another example of a cognitive bias that affects decision-making is the
availability bias. This refers to the phenomena in which individuals, faced
with a decision, give far too much credence to anecdotal evidence that is
particularly salient to them, instead of depending on relevant, known
statistical evidence.1 71 For example, suppose that a person lives in city X.
Recently, two of the person's friends have had their cars stolen. The person
is asked by another friend whether car theft is a big problem in city X.
Previously the person was provided with statistical evidence demonstrating
that, compared to other cities, city X has a very low rate of car thefts.
Nonetheless, the person will probably still say, and genuinely believe, that
car thefts are a big problem in city X, despite the evidence to the contrary.
With these examples of cognitive biases in mind, we move to those
biases that affect our issue specifically. That is, we will examine which
cognitive biases will be triggered by the adoption of limiting retributivism
with its aggravating and mitigating factors and what the effects of those
biases will be. The biases are motivated reasoning,"' optimistic bias,
173
cognitive dissonance, 174 and control illusion. 175
A. MOTIVATED REASONING
Motivated reasoning is a combination of several cognitive biases and
describes the tendency in humans to reach desired conclusions in an
169 See Ross et al., supra note 164, at 882-83.
170 Id. at 883-84.
1 See Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 11, 30
(1998).
172 See, e.g., Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480
(1990).
173 See, e.g., Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 806 (1980).
174 See, e.g., Neil D. Weinstein & William M. Klein, Resistance of Personal Risk
Perceptions to Debiasing Interventions, 14 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 132, 138-39 (1995).
175 See, e.g., Ellen J. Langer, The Illusion of Control, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 311, 311-13 (1975).
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apparently unbiased manner. 176 Specifically, given a set of facts, humans
are more likely to reach the conclusion that they want, without actually
being aware of this predisposition. When making decisions, "one
[naturally] accesses only a biased subset of the relevant beliefs and
rules. 177  Thus people "perceive and interpret evidence in a manner
designed to confirm initial hypotheses, but [they] construct[] the initial
hypotheses themselves through biased cognitive processes designed to
'reason' toward a desired conclusion."' 178 This bias has significant, real-
world importance. For example, people may often convince themselves
they have not had too much to drink, and that even if they are above the
legal limit, they can still handle a car. These individuals honestly believe in
such a statement despite the fact that the majority of people in this situation
cannot, in fact, drive safely. 179 Unfortunately, "the practice of motivated
reasoning appears to be a universal and, perhaps, immutable characteristic
of human nature." 180
B. OPTIMISM BIAS
Optimism bias describes how human beings are simply overly
optimistic about factors affecting their lives. 8  Despite the fact that many
people purport to believe that they are unlucky or that bad things always
happen to them, deep-down people are extremely optimistic.182 Regardless
of how aware of statistics or actuarial calculations people are, they still
often believe bad things will not happen to them while good things will.
For example, people are twice as likely to think their children will be gifted
than is statistically probable, 183 while they are six times more likely to think
they will own a home than statistics suggest. 184  "One particular
manifestation of this bias is the tendency of people to underestimate their
own chance of suffering some adverse outcome even when they accurately
state or even overstate everyone else's chance of suffering the same
outcome."
1 85
176 See Kunda, supra note 172, at 480.
177 Id. at 493.
178 Hanson & Kysar, supra note 161, at 654.
179 Cf Kunda, supra note 172, at 495-96 (discussing examples of the motivated
reasoning bias; the example given here, while not explicitly supported by Kunda's article, is
a logical progression).
180 Hanson & Kysar, supra note 161, at 654.
181 See Weinstein, supra note 173, at 806.
182 See Neil D. Weinstein, Optimistic Biases About Personal Risks, 246 Sci. 1232, 1232
(1989).
183 See Weinstein, supra note 173, at 810.
184 Id.
185 Hanson & Kysar, supra note 161, at 656.
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Optimism bias stems from several sources, chief among them the
belief that risk is avoidable through individual action. In other words, the
individual believes that while something bad may happen to others, he or
she knows how to handle the situation and, as a result, will not suffer the
same outcome. 8 6 Optimism bias is one of the most prevalent biases and,




Cognitive dissonance is somewhat of a subset of both optimism bias
and motivated reasoning.' 88 It describes the general tendency of people to
ignore or undervalue information that contradicts more positive information
about oneself. 89  Behavioral psychologists believe cognitive dissonance
stems from individuals seriously believing themselves to be "smart, nice
people."' 190  Anything that contradicts this self-image is ignored or
downplayed.19' The effect of this cognitive feature is that "[i]n the face of a
known risk.., individuals come readily to the opinion that they
themselves-unlike the average person-are relatively immune, and they
hold onto these optimistic assessments tenaciously.' 92  Thus, "[p]eople
prefer to believe that they are intelligent and are not subjecting themselves
to a substantial risk."' 93 The impact of this type of bias should be clear:
people think more highly of themselves and their abilities than they should.
D. CONTROL ILLUSION
The illusion of control is one which leads individuals to attribute
random events to their own actions; in effect, they believe they can control,
to some extent, random events. 194 Several studies have demonstrated this
bias's effects in a variety of situations.195 The important point here is that
186 See, e.g., Laurie J. Bauman & Karolynn Siegel, Misperception Among Gay Men of the
Risk for AIDS Associated with Their Sexual Behavior, 17 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 329,
344-45 (1987).
187 Hanson & Kysar, supra note 161, at 657.
188 Cf Weinstein & Klein, supra note 174, at 138-39.
189 id.
190 George A. Akerlof & William T. Dickens, The Economic Consequences of Cognitive
Dissonance, 72 AM. ECON. REv. 307, 308-09 (1982).
191 Id.
192 Hanson & Kysar, supra note 161, at 658 (footnotes omitted).
193 Id.
194 See Langer, supra note 175, at 311-13.
195 See, e.g., Ellen J. Langer & Jane Roth, Heads I Win, Tails It's Chance: The Illusion of
Control as a Function of the Sequence of Outcomes in a Purely Chance Task, 32 J.
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people believe that their control of a situation is merited by the actual
situation.
E. LIMITING RETRIBUTIVISM
With these biases in mind, we now look to limiting retributivism
doctrines and their use of aggravating and mitigating factors to determine
the appropriate range of punishment. The salient issue here is the theory's
open and public support of the use of these aggravating and mitigating
factors. The entire concept of a defendant's moral culpability rests on
determining how immoral or blameworthy the defendant and his or her
actions are. Unfortunately, when this theory openly advocates the use of
these aggravating and mitigating factors, it links directly into cognitive
biases, where it becomes problematic.
If the potential criminal is aware of the use of aggravating and
mitigating factors in determining sentencing ranges, his or her decision-
making will be affected by the interaction of his or her cognitive biases and
his or her knowledge of the factors in the present situation that may be
considered in sentencing. Before a person's decision to commit or not to
commit a crime, all four of the aforementioned biases will play their
respective roles in his or her judgment process. Although these biases will
be present whether or not there are aggravating and mitigating factors, the
fact that these factors may play a role in any punishment received will be
shown to exacerbate the effects of these biases. How will these cognitive
biases affect a criminal's decision-making process, given that the criminal
knows that aggravating and mitigating factors may play a role in
sentencing?
Because of cognitive biases, a person debating whether or not to
commit a crime may be comforted by several facts that the criminal
believes to be true. First, the criminal probably does not believe that he or
she will be caught in the first place. Second, if he or she is caught, he or
she will believe that he will receive a sentence or punishment on the lower
end of the range of permissible punishments. As a result of his or her
cognitive biases, the criminal is likely to genuinely believe that the jury or
the judge will find, given the particular facts of the case, that he or she does
not have a high degree of moral culpability. For example, if the person has
a history of abuse as a child, or has a poor family that needs to be fed, or if
the crime contemplated is non-violent in nature, a person may believe that
these or other factors will lead the jury or the judge to find that the
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 951 (1975); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment
Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 ScI. 1124, 1129 (1974).
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defendant's just desert is on the low end of the range of permissible
punishments.
Given the existence of motivated reasoning, we can see that all of the
above statements contribute to the hypothesis about potential punishment
for the crime contemplated that a person would likely create, given the set
of facts as he or she believes them to be, when engaging in the decision-
making process of whether to commit a crime. The cruth is that the
criminal's hypotheses or predictions about any aggravating or mitigating
factors that will affect his or her punishment are probably not accurate, but
instead are highly influenced by cognitive biases. In other words, because
of inherent cognitive biases, a person will conclude that, if caught and
found guilty, he or she will not receive a harsh sentence even though a more
balanced and rational interpretation of the facts would actually lead to a
different conclusion. As mentioned above, the potential criminal's thought
process is an example of motivated reasoning. The jury or judge will likely
have a more balanced and rational interpretation of the facts and
circumstances surrounding the crime.
The same person will also exhibit the optimism bias. If his or her
cognitive processes are being filtered through the optimism bias, a person
will believe that the judge will not be harsh on him because he or she
honestly thinks he or she, and his or her situation, is different. The person
will think the judge will be far more likely to find mitigating factors and far
less likely to find aggravating factors. As a result, the individual will
believe that the judge will determine that the appropriate punishment is on
the very low end of the scale.
In addition, the person may suffer from cognitive dissonance in the
decision-making process. This person may anticipate a lenient judge, for
example, because he or she believes that he or she is a nice person. The
judge will see that he or she is a good person who may have simply fallen
on some bad luck, as he himself believes. Alternatively, he or she may
think he or she is smart enough to outwit the system or the judge. In the
mind of the would-be criminal, all of the potential aggravating factors will
not be important to the judge, who will see through all of the district
attorney's ploys to cast the defendant in a bad light and see him or her for
who he or she really is-a good person who made a mistake and had lots of
forces out of his or her control pushing him or her towards committing the
crime. The criminal believes that he or she is either not very morally
culpable, or can convince the judge that he or she is not morally culpable.
Therefore, the criminal believes that the judge will grant him or her a range
of sentences on the lower end of the spectrum. Of course, the criminal's
confidence in his or her good nature or ability is likely unfounded.
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Lastly, the would-be criminal may believe that he or she has a way to
convince the jury or the judge to be lenient on him. He or she may believe
that he or she has a secret method to put the judge or the jury in a good
mood or to make them sympathetic to his or her pleas. While there is a
chance the defendant may actually have a method to achieve these goals, it
is more likely he or she is simply demonstrating control illusion and, in fact,
will be unable to control the judge or jury.
While the examples given above are not examples of purely one type
of cognitive bias or another, they combine to demonstrate the collective
effects of these biases on a criminal's psychology and, thus, how the
criminal's decision-making process may be affected. Together, these
illustrations demonstrate how a person may anticipate a sentence far lower
than he or she rationally should. The open use of aggravating and
mitigating factors in determining sentences plays strongly into the effects of
these cognitive biases. By openly admitting that they are used in
determining sentences, limiting retributivism is, in essence, advertising
directly to these biases. Reliance on them in determining sentencing simply
adds more factors into which cognitive biases can play, with the effect of
altering the criminal's expectations.
This may have a disastrous effect if one abides by a utilitarian theory
of punishment. Under limiting retributivism, the use of these aggravating
and mitigating factors in determining punishment will lead to would-be
criminals anticipating punishments extremely below those which they may
actually receive. Here, another law and economics example is useful.
Suppose the existence of aggravating and mitigating factors leads criminals
to believe that the average sentence will be one year, while the average
sentence is in fact five years. The deterrence effect of the punishment, then,
is five times lower than it should be. In essence, the very existence of these
factors in determining punishment may lead to a person's anticipation of
less prison time and hence under-deterrence.
Utilitarianism cannot be reconciled with a system that leads to such
under-deterrence. Regardless of whether within the permissible punishment
ranges utilitarian principles are utilized, the primary basis on which the
range of punishment is decided is contrary to the goals of utilitarianism.
Such a retributivist appeal to utilitarianism is similar to a store attempting to
appeal to penny-wise shoppers by increasing the price of their goods by five
dollars and then giving two-dollar coupons. When the system of
determining punishment leads to under-deterrence, the subsequent use of
utilitarian concerns is of lesser to no value.
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VI. ACHIEVING UTILITARIAN GOALS
Limiting retributivism's use of aggravating and mitigating factors in
determining punishment will likely result in strong under-deterrence of
crime. Insights into human behavioral psychology demonstrate this fact.
196
Therefore, limiting retributivism proponents' attempts to appeal to
supporters of utilitarian theories of criminal punishment should be rebuffed
as contrary to utilitarian aims. However, establishing that limiting
retributivism does not sufficiently serve utilitarian goals does not end the
debate. A careful reader will notice that the cognitive biases identified by
behavioral psychologists, and used here to suggest the failure of limiting a
retributivist system of punishment to achieve utilitarian goals, may also be
used to challenge utilitarian systems of punishment as well. After all, the
same cognitive biases that lead criminals to irrationally believe they will
either not be caught or will be found innocent may also affect deterrent
levels in a purely utilitarian system. In this section, I defend the argument
that utilitarians should reject limiting retributivism appeals to utilitarian
goals because cognitive biases create a double under-deterrent effect under
a limiting retributivism system while they create only a single under-
deterrent effect under a utilitarian system. Furthermore, I highlight possible
methods to adjust utilitarian policies to accommodate previously mentioned
research in behavioral psychology and to better achieve utilitarian goals.
Given the research in behavioral psychology, utilitarians face a
difficult task in arguing in further support for utilitarian theories of
punishment, specifically deterrence-based punishment. Because behavioral
psychologists have shown that people do not rationally react or respond to
facts, it could be argued that all of the deterrence efforts of utilitarianism
will ultimately fail. Critics of utilitarianism will argue that this research
proves that utilitarian goals of deterrence are unreachable and therefore
utilitarianism is an unworkable system of punishment. Yet, these
arguments that utilitarianism is an unworkable system fail under scrutiny.
The evidence that people do not act as rational individuals, the basis of
much of utilitarianism and of law and economics, weakens the allure of
utilitarianism; yet it does not destroy the theory altogether. Optimism bias,
the illusion of control, motivated reasoning, and cognitive dissonance all
serve to decrease the overall deterrent effect of criminal punishment;
however, they do not destroy all deterrent effect. Whether because
criminals think they have less of a chance of getting caught or judges will
be lenient with them if caught, the overall expected harm that a criminal
will anticipate will be lower than it should be. The reason behind this sub-
optimal deterrent level is the effect of cognitive biases.
196 See supra Part IV.
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But does this mean that punishment has no deterrent effect? The
answer is no. While the deterrent effect is not optimal, it still exists, albeit
in a weaker form. At this point, one may wonder, is this not the same
argument used to discredit retributivism's appeal to utilitarianism? Was not
the fact that retributivism led to under-deterrence the very reason it was
held to be contrary to utilitarian goals? The answer is yes, but only to a
degree. The real question then becomes which system creates a stronger
deterrent effect?
To answer this question, one needs to determine which system is more
affected by these cognitive biases: limiting retributivism or utilitarianism.
In a limiting retributivism system, two factors exist that will lead to under-
deterrence. First, the use of basic utilitarian principles to alter a sentence
within the acceptable range will not have as much deterrent effect as one
would hope. Second, the open use of mitigating and aggravating factors in
determining punishment will create further under-deterrence.1 97 Both steps
in the determination of punishment under limiting retributivism, creating
the range of permissible punishment and altering the specific punishment
within that range, deter at a sub-optimal level. Utilitarianism does not face
this double under-deterrence effect. Under a utilitarian system, the general
deterrent effect of the punishment will be less than ideal, but no other
factors will further reduce the deterrent effect. In other words, there is
likely only one point where cognitive biases create sub-optimal deterrence
levels.
An example will demonstrate this difference appropriately. The crime
at issue is auto theft. Suppose it is an ideal world, where people act
according to the classic economic view of human beings as rational and the
optimal level of deterrence is created by a punishment of twenty years. In
other words, this punishment provides the ideal deterrent effect. In a
utilitarian system, one found guilty of this crime will face a twenty-year
sentence if caught and convicted. Now, let us assume that human nature, as
defined by behavioral psychology, will result in a 20% decrease in the
deterrent effect, either because criminals expect not to get caught, or
because they expect leniency in sentencing, or for whatever other reason.
Whereas under the previous scenario of completely rational human
behavior, a stated punishment of twenty years in jail has an expected
punishment of twenty years, now there is an expected punishment of
sixteen years. Thus, with cognitive biases in mind, a twenty-year sentence
no longer creates the optimal deterrence level because criminals will expect
a sixteen-year sentence. The utilitarian system has two options: (1) increase
the punishment by 25% to twenty-five years, so the aggregate effect is
197 See supra Part III.
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twenty years of expected punishment, resulting in the optimal deterrence
level or (2) accept less-than-ideal deterrent levels-an 80% effective
deterrent effect.
Now analyze this situation under a limiting retributivism system of
punishment. Under a limiting retributivism system, assume that the range
of punishment for someone convicted of stealing a car is fifteen to twenty-
five years. Because of the open use of aggravating and mitigating factors in
determining sentencing, the potential car thief will expect a 20% decrease in
the applied range. Now, he or she expects a range of twelve to twenty years
instead of fifteen to twenty-five. The anticipation of a decreased range of
punishment, which as mentioned above stems from cognitive biases, is the
first way in which limiting retributivism under-deters.
Next, the criminal will further expect his or her sentence to be 20%
less than is probable within the range. This occurs because the criminal
will anticipate this second level of decision-making by the judge-he or she
will know that the judge has discretion to sentence within a given range. At
this point, cognitive biases may lead the criminal to expect or anticipate a
specific level of punishment within the range that is less than what is
actually likely, given the facts of the case. This is where the second level of
under-deterrence occurs in limiting retributivism. Within the eight-year
range, the facts of the case may indicate four years of added punishment,
yet the criminal's prediction of this number is affected by his or her biases,
and as a result he or she will predict 3.2 years of added punishment. Thus
the criminal's expected punishment will be 15.2 years (12 years plus 3.2
years).
Thus, the aggregate deterrence level will be closer to the optimal level
under a utilitarian system. Under utilitarianism the potential criminal will
expect a 16 year sentence, while under limiting retributivism he or she will
expect a 15.2 year sentence. Because deterrence levels are higher under a
utilitarian system of punishment than under a limiting retributivism system,
adherents of utilitarian theory must reject limiting retributivism. Using a
utilitarian system will lead to greater deterrence and decrease the likelihood
of future crimes. Accordingly, utilitarianism provides the greatest level of
deterrent effects. Thus, for those who hope the law can have a deterrent
effect by creating ex ante incentives for individuals not to commit crimes,
utilitarianism is the only system and theory of punishment that is
acceptable. If one is steadfast in the belief of the value of using ex ante
incentives, the only system permissible is that which comes closest to
creating optimal levels, which is utilitarianism.
Yet this does not mean that utilitarians have won and should pack up
and go home happy. As has been demonstrated, utilitarian systems of
punishment may still not result in optimal levels of deterrence. Human
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psychology undoubtedly decreases the deterrent effect of criminal laws.
Anyone who believes the law can and should create ideal levels of
incentives to create optimal outcomes, including most proponents of
utilitarian theories of punishment, has much more work to do.
As the recent developments in the fields of behavioral law and
economics indicate, the goal of optimal outcomes may still be reached if we
tailor laws in recognition of cognitive biases or create laws--or, more
specifically, systems of punishment-that minimize the effects of these
biases.198 In fact, unbeknownst to lawyers at the time of the rules' creation,
several legal rules can be seen as methods to overcome cognitive biases. 199
An excellent example of such a law is the "business judgment rule" in
corporate law. This rule essentially states that when challenging a business
decision of a company executive, all that is required to defend the
decision-absent any evidence of self-dealing-is that it was in some way
rational, even if not the best decision. 00 In essence, this rule can be seen as
compensating for the existence of hindsight bias by declaring that the
outcome is not important at all, and saying that if there was any reasonable
rationale for making the decision that was ultimately made, then the
decision is legitimate.0°
While the example of the business judgment rule demonstrates how
behavioral psychology insights can help craft better laws, or justify
previously existing ones, these laws are examples of ex post reasoning.
What concerns utilitarians are ex ante incentives. The cognitive biases that
affect ex ante incentives are very different than those that affect ex post
decisions. In other words, the hindsight effect, highlighted by the business
judgment rule example, focuses more on a person's view of a situation after
that situation has occurred, and thus is unlikely to have effects on ex ante
decision-making and hence ex ante incentives. Unfortunately, biases that
affect such decision-making, for example, optimism bias and motivated
reasoning, have been demonstrated to be extremely difficult to adjust for or
to alter.202
Utilitarians face a tough challenge, but one that may not be
insurmountable. Utilitarianism has been demonstrated to have at least some
effect on deterring criminals. Further investigations may prove that
cognitive biases are, in fact, correctable. If not, other, more correctable
biases may be further investigated and applied. Insight into such biases
198 See Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 159, at 1522-41.
199 Id.
200 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
201 Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 159.
202 Hanson & Kysar, supra note 161, at 657.
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may not lead to a system of perfect deterrence, but it may assist utilitarians
in crafting laws that are better able to deter criminals. Through the
research, use, and adoption of laws tailored to accommodate for, or to alter,
cognitive biases, deterrence levels may be increased.
VII. CONCLUSION
Recent developments in retributivist theory have resulted in the
creation of a limiting retributivism system of criminal punishment. Such a
system attempts to appeal to utilitarian concerns in an effort to garner
support from those who desire the criminal law to serve utilitarian purposes.
Utilitarians must reject this appeal, however, because it leads to lesser
deterrent levels compared to those expected under a properly utilitarian
system of punishment.
Recent developments in behavioral psychology suggest reasons why
the limited retributivist system of punishment may lead to sub-optimal
deterrence levels. Limiting retributivist systems of punishment are affected
by cognitive biases on two separate occasions, leading to a double under-
deterrence effect, while utilitarian systems of punishment only face a single
under-deterrence effect. Simply put, cognitive biases suggest that limiting
retributivism systems of punishment will lead to higher levels of under-
deterrence than will utilitarian systems of punishment. In light of these
inferences, utilitarians must resist the appeals of proponents of limiting
retributivism and insist on a more rigid utilitarian system of punishment.
Utilitarians must engage in further research in an effort to mitigate the
effects of cognitive biases on deterrence levels. The ex ante incentives that
utilitarians wish to create through the law may be improved if laws are
drafted to account for-and overcome-demonstrated cognitive biases.
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